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+title: IT security: CCC against weakening of encryption by law
+date: 2019-06-11 20:42:46 
+updated: 2019-06-14 16:47:27 
+author: linus
+tags: update, pressemitteilung, verschlüsselung, bmi
+
+Chaos Computer Club (CCC) signed the open letter against backdoors.
+
+<!-- TEASER_END -->
+
+TO: German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community
+
+IN COPY: German Federal Foreign Office, German Federal Ministry of
+Justice and Consumer Protection, German Federal Ministry of Economic
+Affairs and Energy, German Federal Office for Information Security
+
+**Subject: Planned encroachment on encryption of messenger services
+would have fatal consequences**
+
+Ladies and Gentlemen,
+
+the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI) plans
+a change in the law to make it easier for German police and security
+authorities to gain access to the digital communication of suspects in
+the future, according to media reports. To this end, providers of
+messenger services such as Whatsapp, Threema, and iMessage are to be
+required by law to modify their encryption technology in such a way that
+authorities can record the entire communication of users in cases which
+have generated suspicion. ([reported in
+Gerrman](https://www.spiegel.de/plus/horst-seehofer-greift-whatsapp-an-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000164076162))
+
+We expressly warn against such a step and demand an immediate
+renunciation of this or similar political intentions at German and
+European level. The proposed reform would precipitously reduce the
+security level of millions of German Internet users, create new gateways
+for foreign intelligence services and Internet criminals, and massively
+damage Germany's international reputation as a leading location for a
+secure and data protection-oriented digital economy. Instead of
+implementing reform ideas that are years out of date, the German Federal
+Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community should, in our view,
+take a new security policy path and develop proposals that improve the
+work of police and security authorities without downgrading the security
+of IT systems and private communications in Germany as a whole.
+
+Our criticism in detail:
+
+## The German Crypto Policy
+
+At the end of May, it became known that the Federal Ministry of the
+Interior, Building and Community is planning to extend the existing
+Telecommunications Act to encrypted messengers such as WhatsApp, Signal,
+Threema, Wire, and Telegram. This means in concrete terms: The operators
+of these services must redesign their software in such a way that the
+content of messages can be passed on in unencrypted form to security
+authorities. Should the operators refuse to do so, their services would
+be blocked in Germany. Representatives of the British GCHQ describe in
+their “Ghost Proposal”^[\[1\]](#ftnt1){#ftnt_ref1}^ what a technical
+implementation of the backdoors in the messenger apps could look like.
+This proposal has recently been strongly criticized in an open letter by
+an international alliance of industry, academia, and civil
+society.^[\[2\]](#ftnt2){#ftnt_ref2}^
+
+The BMI proposal undermines twenty years of successful crypto policy in
+Germany.^[\[3\]](#ftnt3){#ftnt_ref3}^ In the cornerstones of the German
+Crypto Policy of 1999,^[\[4\]](#ftnt4){#ftnt_ref4}^ the then federal
+government agreed on a principle that became known under the maxim
+“security through encryption and security despite encryption”. This
+principle has since been confirmed several times by the subsequent
+federal governments. In 2014, Germany even expressed the ambition to
+become the “No. 1 encryption location”^[\[5\]](#ftnt5){#ftnt_ref5}^ in
+the world. A break with these commitments would cause lasting damage to
+Germany's IT security in administration, industry, and society.
+
+## Impact on IT security
+
+The planned obligation on messenger operators would result in operators
+being required to incorporate a vulnerability in their software. This
+demands a profound encroachment on the existing complex software systems
+of the operators. This vulnerability could be exploited by intelligence
+services and criminals to gain access to sensitive information from
+individuals, government authorities, and companies. Current
+examples^[\[6\]](#ftnt6){#ftnt_ref6}^ show that securing a messenger is
+already complex enough, without incorporating additional vulnerabilities
+and thus further jeopardizing IT security.
+
+At the same time, this incorporation of vulnerabilities would enable
+employees of the operators to view communication content, something
+which is currently not possible. This not only increases the potential
+for abuse – a central storage of the required cryptographic
+keys^[\[7\]](#ftnt7){#ftnt_ref7}^ would also represent a primary target
+for attackers, which in the case of a successful attack could lead to
+the disclosure of the communication of all (!) users
+(Single-Point-of-Failure).
+
+In addition, the new version of the respective messenger app with a
+backdoor would have to be installed as a software update. Either all
+German users or selected German users would receive this backdoor as an
+update. This process would shake consumer confidence in security updates
+to the core, and would thus have a lasting negative impact on IT
+security in Germany.
+
+Should the messenger operators fail to implement the planned measure,
+the Ministry of the Interior plans to block their services in Germany.
+This would also be the only way for the authorities to deal with
+messengers whose encryption does not require a central operator and in
+which no backdoors could be implemented by regulation (e.g. Pretty Good
+Privacy, Off-The-Record). This would inevitably mean that there would no
+longer be any secure messenger communication within Germany. However, a
+technical implementation would be virtually impossible, especially for
+open source messenger apps such as Signal. It would require a dedicated
+IT infrastructure which deeply encroaches on civil liberties, in order
+to rule out the bypassing of these blocks (including blocking Virtual
+Private Networks \[VPNs\] and The Onion Router \[TOR\]), as criminals
+would be the first to attempt this.^[\[8\]](#ftnt8){#ftnt_ref8}^
+
+However, this would not “only” affect German authorities (e.g. police,
+fire brigade, technical relief), companies and citizens in general, but
+also people subject to professional confidentiality (e.g. lawyers,
+clergymen, physicians, journalists, and parliamentarians) and other
+groups of persons who are in particular need of protection.
+
+Meanwhile, former intelligence chiefs are increasingly arguing that in
+the age of cyber crime, data leaks, and espionage, the benefits of
+comprehensive encryption (without backdoors) more than outweigh the loss
+of surveillance capability. Strategic interests such as the stability of
+the IT sector and the IT ecosystem outweigh the tactical interests of
+prosecutors, such as former NSA chief Michael Hayden and former head of
+the British domestic intelligence service
+MI5.^[\[9\]](#ftnt9){#ftnt_ref9}^
+
+## Empirical state of knowledge and alternatives
+
+In keeping with the cornerstones of the German Crypto Policy, the German
+federal government decided in 1999 not to weaken encryption (including
+the installation of backdoors) but to use malware (“State Trojan”) to
+obtain data before/after encryption. For understandable reasons, the
+German Federal Constitutional Court set high barriers for this measure.
+Instead of carrying out an urgently needed needs analysis on the basis
+of the existing surveillance measures and the
+overall^[\[10\]](#ftnt10){#ftnt_ref10}^ surveillance account demanded
+many years ago by the Federal Constitutional Court, a regulation is now
+to be implemented that ignores^[\[11\]](#ftnt11){#ftnt_ref11}^ more than
+twenty years of scientific findings in IT security research.
+
+The often cited hypothesis that secret services and law enforcement
+authorities no longer have access to relevant data due to encryption
+(going dark) has not been empirically proven to
+date.^[\[12\]](#ftnt12){#ftnt_ref12}^ On the contrary, technological
+developments in recent decades have resulted in more data being
+available to prosecutors than ever
+before.^[\[13\]](#ftnt13){#ftnt_ref13}^ The law enforcement authorities
+have so far documented very little regarding the number of cases where
+encrypted communication has actually brought investigations to a halt.
+Nor is there a complete overview of which alternative possibilities for
+collecting the necessary data are already legal in Germany and where
+there are still gaps.^[\[14\]](#ftnt14){#ftnt_ref14}^
+
+## International spillover effects
+
+If this proposal were to be implemented, it would also have a negative
+impact far beyond Germany's borders. Authoritarian states would refer to
+this regulation and request corresponding content data from the
+messenger operators with reference to the fact that this is technically
+possible, given that it is already being done in Germany. This would
+massively affect the communication of human rights activists,
+journalists, and other pursued groups ofpeople – groups of people that
+German foreign and development aid policy has tried to protect up to now
+and supports to the tune of billions of Euros annually. Germany must
+also be aware of its responsibility in the world in this area. By
+deliberately weakening secure messenger apps, Germany would jeopardize
+its credibility in foreign policy as an advocate of a free and open
+Internet.^[\[15\]](#ftnt15){#ftnt_ref15}^ The Network Enforcement Act
+serves here as a warning of the impact German legislation can have on
+the world.^[\[16\]](#ftnt16){#ftnt_ref16}^
+
+## Germany as a business location
+
+Administration, businesses, and consumers must be able to rely on the
+fact that the use of digital products and services meets the
+requirements for the protection of their data and the integrity of their
+systems. For companies in particular, this plays a major role in the
+choice of their production location. They establish their headquarters
+in those places where they know their trade secrets and customer data
+are protected.
+
+Sabotage and industrial espionage caused 43 billion Euro damage to the
+industrial sector alone in 2016/2017.^[\[17\]](#ftnt17){#ftnt_ref17}^ It
+can be assumed that a weakening of encryption will further increase
+these figures, as built-in backdoors can also be abused by foreign
+intelligence services and criminals. If Germany wants to be an
+innovation-friendly and competitive business location, technical
+backdoors that allow access for third parties must continue to be
+excluded.
+
+In addition, Germany is also a location for IT security companies with,
+among other things, a focus on encryption technologies. The
+trustworthiness of these companies in particular would be massively
+jeopardized by the planned intentions. This would weaken Germany as a
+location for the IT security industry as a whole, which directly
+contradicts the industrial policy goals of Germany and Europe.
+
+We expressly warn against the planned intentions of the German Federal
+Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community to regulate messenger
+services and demand an immediate abandonment of this and similar
+political intentions at German and European level. In addition, an
+official assessment from the following bodies would be required: :
+
+-   The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) (focus:
+    possible damage to German industry and the digital economy),
+-   of the German Federal Foreign Office (focus: Spillover effects,
+    especially in authoritarian states, loss of Germany’s reputation as
+    an established constitutional state),
+-   German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (focus:
+    loss of consumer confidence),
+-   Federal Office for Information Security (focus: jeopardizing IT
+    Security in Germany for the state, industry, and society).
+
+Yours sincerely
+
+[**German version**](/de/updates/2019/encrypted-messengers)
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Links:
+
+-   [\[1\]](#ftnt_ref1){#ftnt1} [Ian Levy, Crispin Robinson: Principles
+    for a More Informed Exceptional Access
+    Debate](https://www.lawfareblog.com/principles-more-informed-exceptional-access-debate)
+-   [\[2\]](#ftnt_ref2){#ftnt2} [Coalition Letter: Open Letter to
+    GCHQ](https://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Coalition_Letter_to_GCHQ_on_Ghost_Proposal_-_May_22_2019.pdf)
+-   [\[3\]](#ftnt_ref3){#ftnt3} [Sven Herpig, Stefan Heumann: Encryption
+    Debate in
+    Germany](https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debate-in-germany-pub-79215)
+-   [\[4\]](#ftnt_ref4){#ftnt4} [Die Raven-Homepage: Eckpunkte der
+    deutschen
+    Kryptopolitik](https://hp.kairaven.de/law/eckwertkrypto.html) (The
+    Cornerstones of German Crypto Policy)
+-   [\[5\]](#ftnt_ref5){#ftnt5} [Die Bundesregierung: Digitale Agenda
+    2014 -
+    2017](https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/digitale-agenda.pdf?__blob%253DpublicationFile%2526v%253D3)
+-   [\[6\]](#ftnt_ref6){#ftnt6} [Jürgen Schmidt: Kritische
+    Sicherheitslücke gefährdet Milliarden
+    WhatsApp-Nutzer](https://www.heise.de/security/meldung/Kritische-Sicherheitsluecke-gefaehrdet-Milliarden-WhatsApp-Nutzer-4186365.html)
+    (Critical vulnerability threatens billions of WhatsApp users) und
+    [Marius Mestermann: Ernster iPhone-Bug: Apple schaltet
+    FaceTime-Gruppenanrufe
+    ab](https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/nachrichten-am-morgen-die-news-in-echtzeit-a-1249669.html)
+    (Apple turns off FaceTime group calls)
+-   [\[7\]](#ftnt_ref7){#ftnt7} This is one possible implementation of
+    these backdoors. There are also other implementation possibilities,
+    but these are technically no less problematic.
+-   [\[8\]](#ftnt_ref8){#ftnt8} [Matthias Schulze: Überwachung von
+    WhatsApp und Co. Going dark? (Monitoring of WhatsApp and
+    Co.)](http://percepticon.de/2019/06/04-going-dark/)
+-   [\[9\]](#ftnt_ref9){#ftnt9} [Michael Hayden: The Pros and Cons of
+    Encryption](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v%253D6HNnVcp6NYA) and
+    [The Guardian: Ex-MI5 Chef warns against crackdown on encrypted
+    messaging
+    apps](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/11/ex-mi5-chief-warns-against-crackdown-encrypted-messaging-apps)
+-   [\[10\]](#ftnt_ref10){#ftnt10} [Constanze Kurz:
+    Überwachungsgesamtrechnung: Vorratsdatenspeicherung ist der Tropfen,
+    der das Fass zum Überlaufen
+    bringt](https://netzpolitik.org/2015/ueberwachungsgesamtrechnung-vorratsdatenspeicherung-ist-der-tropfen-der-das-fass-zum-ueberlaufen-bringt/)
+    (Overall Surveillance Account: Blanket Data Retention is the Straw
+    that Broke the Camel’s Back)
+-   [\[11\]](#ftnt_ref11){#ftnt11} [Danielle Kehl, Andi Wilson, Kevin
+    Bankston: Doomed to repeat history? Lessons from the Crypto Wars of
+    the
+    1990s](https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3407-doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/Crypto%252520Wars_ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf)
+-   [\[12\]](#ftnt_ref12){#ftnt12} [Matthias Schulze, Going Dark?
+    Dilemma zwischen sicherer, privater Kommunikation und den
+    Sicherheitsinteressen von
+    Staaten.](http://www.bpb.de/apuz/259141/going-dark?p%253Dall)
+    (Dilemma between secure, private communication and the security
+    interests of states.)
+-   [\[13\]](#ftnt_ref13){#ftnt13} [Peter Swire, The FBI Doesn’t Need
+    More Access: We’re Already in the Golden Age of
+    Surveillance](https://www.justsecurity.org/17496/fbi-access-golden-age-surveillance/)
+    and [Matthias Schulze: Clipper Meets Apple vs. FBI—A Comparison of
+    the Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and
+    2016](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805)
+-   [\[14\]](#ftnt_ref14){#ftnt14} [Sven Herpig: A Framework for
+    Government Hacking in Criminal
+    Investigations](https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/framework_for_government_hacking_in_criminal_investigations.pdf)
+-   [\[15\]](#ftnt_ref15){#ftnt15} [Matthias Schulze: Verschlüsselung in
+    Gefahr](https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/verschluesselung-in-gefahr/)
+    (Encryption in danger) and [Cathleen Berger: Is Germany
+    (involuntarily) setting a global digital
+    agenda?](https://medium.com/@_cberger_/is-germany-involuntarily-setting-a-global-digital-agenda-21c7eb735e26)
+-   [\[16\]](#ftnt_ref16){#ftnt16} [Reporter ohne Grenzen: Russland
+    kopiert Gesetz gegen
+    Hassbotschaften](https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/russland/alle-meldungen/meldung/russland-kopiert-gesetz-gegen-hassbotschaften/)
+    (Russia copied law against hate messages)
+-   [\[17\]](#ftnt_ref17){#ftnt17} [bitkom: Spionage, Sabotage und
+    Datendiebstahl – Wirtschaftsschutz in der
+    Industrie](https://www.bitkom.org/sites/default/files/file/import/181008-Bitkom-Studie-Wirtschaftsschutz-2018-NEU.pdf)
+    (Espionage, sabotage and data theft – economic protection in
+    industry)