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Enforced at restore via a login-time stamp, written only at genuine
logins so the limit stays absolute rather than sliding. The cookie
name rotation logs everyone out once at deploy. Second-factor users
are deliberately not treated worse than password-only ones.
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Enrolled users get a pending marker instead of a session after the
password step; a valid code through the challenge writes the real
session via reset_session. otp_required without enrollment funnels
into setup everywhere except the enrollment, user, and login
machinery.
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in the admin interface possible
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* removed some cookie related tests
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* http basic auth and login from cookie have been removed
* no it does not work yet, it's so f*cking secure, it won't even let legitimate users login
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