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1 | title: Joint civil society statement: States use of digital surveillance technologies to fight pandemic must respect human rights | ||
2 | date: 2020-04-03 00:01:03 | ||
3 | updated: 2020-04-03 00:01:03 | ||
4 | author: 46halbe | ||
5 | tags: update, pressemitteilung | ||
6 | |||
7 | The COVID-19 pandemic is a global public health emergency that requires a coordinated and large-scale response by governments worldwide. However, States’ efforts to contain the virus must not be used as a cover to usher in a new era of greatly expanded systems of invasive digital surveillance. | ||
8 | |||
9 | <!-- TEASER_END --> | ||
10 | |||
11 | We, the undersigned organizations, urge governments to show leadership | ||
12 | in tackling the pandemic in a way that ensures that the use of digital | ||
13 | technologies to track and monitor individuals and populations is carried | ||
14 | out strictly in line with human rights. | ||
15 | |||
16 | Technology can and should play an important role during this effort to | ||
17 | save lives, such as to spread public health messages and increase access | ||
18 | to health care. However, an increase in non-consensual state digital | ||
19 | surveillance powers, such as obtaining access to mobile phone location | ||
20 | data, threatens privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of | ||
21 | association, in ways that could violate rights and degrade trust in | ||
22 | public authorities – undermining the effectiveness of any public health | ||
23 | response. Such measures also pose a risk of discrimination and may | ||
24 | disproportionately harm already marginalized communities. | ||
25 | |||
26 | These are extraordinary times, but human rights law still applies. | ||
27 | Indeed, the human rights framework is designed to ensure that different | ||
28 | rights can be carefully balanced to protect individuals and wider | ||
29 | societies. States cannot simply disregard rights such as privacy and | ||
30 | freedom of expression in the name of tackling a public health crisis. On | ||
31 | the contrary, protecting human rights also promotes public health. Now | ||
32 | more than ever, governments must rigorously ensure that any restrictions | ||
33 | to these rights is in line with long-established human rights | ||
34 | safeguards. | ||
35 | |||
36 | This crisis offers an opportunity to demonstrate our shared humanity. We | ||
37 | can make extraordinary efforts to fight this pandemic that are | ||
38 | consistent with human rights standards and the rule of law. The | ||
39 | decisions that governments make now to confront the pandemic will shape | ||
40 | what the world looks like in the future. | ||
41 | |||
42 | We call on all governments not to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic with | ||
43 | increased digital surveillance unless the following conditions are met: | ||
44 | |||
45 | 1. Surveillance measures adopted to address the pandemic must be | ||
46 | lawful, necessary and proportionate. They must be provided for by | ||
47 | law and must be justified by legitimate public health objectives, as | ||
48 | determined by the appropriate public health authorities, and be | ||
49 | proportionate to those needs. Governments must be transparent about | ||
50 | the measures they are taking so that they can be scrutinized and if | ||
51 | appropriate later modified, retracted, or overturned. We cannot | ||
52 | allow the COVID-19 pandemic to serve as an excuse for indiscriminate | ||
53 | mass surveillance. | ||
54 | 2. If governments expand monitoring and surveillance powers then such | ||
55 | powers must be time-bound, and only continue for as long as | ||
56 | necessary to address the current pandemic. We cannot allow the | ||
57 | COVID-19 pandemic to serve as an excuse for indefinite surveillance. | ||
58 | 3. States must ensure that increased collection, retention, and | ||
59 | aggregation of personal data, including health data, is only used | ||
60 | for the purposes of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Data | ||
61 | collected, retained, and aggregated to respond to the pandemic must | ||
62 | be limited in scope, time-bound in relation to the pandemic and must | ||
63 | not be used for commercial or any other purposes. We cannot allow | ||
64 | the COVID-19 pandemic to serve as an excuse to gut individual’s | ||
65 | right to privacy. | ||
66 | 4. Governments must take every effort to protect people’s data, | ||
67 | including ensuring sufficient security of any personal data | ||
68 | collected and of any devices, applications, networks, or services | ||
69 | involved in collection, transmission, processing, and storage. Any | ||
70 | claims that data is anonymous must be based on evidence and | ||
71 | supported with sufficient information regarding how it has been | ||
72 | anonymized. We cannot allow attempts to respond to this pandemic to | ||
73 | be used as justification for compromising people’s digital safety. | ||
74 | 5. Any use of digital surveillance technologies in responding to | ||
75 | COVID-19, including big data and artificial intelligence systems, | ||
76 | must address the risk that these tools will facilitate | ||
77 | discrimination and other rights abuses against racial minorities, | ||
78 | people living in poverty, and other marginalized populations, whose | ||
79 | needs and lived realities may be obscured or misrepresented in large | ||
80 | datasets. We cannot allow the COVID-19 pandemic to further increase | ||
81 | the gap in the enjoyment of human rights between different groups in | ||
82 | society. | ||
83 | 6. If governments enter into data sharing agreements with other public | ||
84 | or private sector entities, they must be based on law, and the | ||
85 | existence of these agreements and information necessary to assess | ||
86 | their impact on privacy and human rights must be publicly disclosed | ||
87 | – in writing, with sunset clauses, public oversight and other | ||
88 | safeguards by default. Businesses involved in efforts by governments | ||
89 | to tackle COVID-19 must undertake due diligence to ensure they | ||
90 | respect human rights, and ensure any intervention is firewalled from | ||
91 | other business and commercial interests. We cannot allow the | ||
92 | COVID-19 pandemic to serve as an excuse for keeping people in the | ||
93 | dark about what information their governments are gathering and | ||
94 | sharing with third parties. | ||
95 | 7. Any response must incorporate accountability protections and | ||
96 | safeguards against abuse. Increased surveillance efforts related to | ||
97 | COVID-19 should not fall under the domain of security or | ||
98 | intelligence agencies and must be subject to effective oversight by | ||
99 | appropriate independent bodies. Further, individuals must be given | ||
100 | the opportunity to know about and challenge any COVID-19 related | ||
101 | measures to collect, aggregate, and retain, and use data. | ||
102 | Individuals who have been subjected to surveillance must have access | ||
103 | to effective remedies. | ||
104 | 8. COVID-19 related responses that include data collection efforts | ||
105 | should include means for free, active, and meaningful participation | ||
106 | of relevant stakeholders, in particular experts in the public health | ||
107 | sector and the most marginalized population groups. | ||
108 | |||
109 | [All | ||
110 | Signatories](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/joint-civil-society-statement-states-use-digital-surveillance-technologies-fight) | ||
111 | of this joint statement. | ||