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1title: British government to answer fast-track spy challenge
2date: 2014-01-23 22:45:00
3updated: 2014-01-24 00:31:15
4author: stefan
5tags: update, pressemitteilung
6
7Campaigners have welcomed the decision of the European Court of Human Rights to move quickly in determining whether the recently revealed internet surveillance programmes operated by GCHQ are in breach of the law.
8
9<!-- TEASER_END -->
10
11Big Brother Watch, the Open Rights Group and English PEN, along with
12German internet activist Constanze Kurz, brought the action after
13revelations about the collection of huge amounts of internet data by the
14British spy base.\
15\
16The court has completed its preliminary examination of the case and has
17communicated it to the British government, asking it to justify how
18GCHQ's practices and the current system of oversight comply with the
19right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention. The court
20has also given the case a rare 'priority' designation. The government
21now has until 2 May to respond, after which the case will move into the
22final stages before judgment.\
23\
24The groups claim that by collecting data on millions of people not under
25any suspicion, GCHQ has infringed on the privacy rights of not only
26British but also European citizens.\
27\
28
29Nick Pickles, director of Big Brother Watch, said: 'We now know that
30GCHQ operate a central database of communications despite Parliament
31being told such a database would not be built. This legal challenge is
32an essential part of getting to the bottom of why the public and
33Parliament have not been properly informed about the scale of
34surveillance and why our privacy has been subverted on an industrial
35scale.'\
36\
37Jo Glanville, director of English PEN, said: 'The government has so far
38failed to address the revelations about GCHQ's activities with any sense
39of urgency. We're delighted that the European Court of Human Rights has
40made the action a priority. This only ever happens in a minority of
41cases and is a measure of the significant international concern about
42the UK's unchecked surveillance.'
43
44Jim Killock, Executive Director of the Open Rights Group, said: ‘The
45digital age comes with the potential for government to try to monitor
46everything and everyone almost constantly. We've learnt that our laws
47have been abused to fulfil this ambition.‘
48
49Daniel Carey, Solicitor at Deighton Pierce Glynn solicitors, who
50represent the applicants, said: 'The European Court of Human Rights has
51acted remarkably quickly in communicating the case to the Government and
52designating it as a priority. It has also acted decisively by requiring
53the Government to explain how the UK's surveillance practices and
54oversight mechanisms comply with the right to privacy. This gives real
55hope to the public that the European Court of Human Rights will require
56reform if the Government continues to insist that nothing is wrong.'\
57\
58Constanze Kurz, computer scientist and Internet activist, said: 'The
59European Court of Human Rights expects fast answers from the British
60government. It is vital now that human rights and the respect of the
61privacy of millions of people will also be prioritized not only by the
62British government and parliament but also at EU level.'
63
64**Links**:\
65\
66You can support the legal action and donate to the campaign at:
67<https://www.privacynotprism.org.uk/>\
68\
69
70For further information please contact:
71
72- Nick Pickles, Big Brother Watch: 07505 448925 or 0207 3406030 /
73 press(at)bigbrotherwatch.org.uk
74- Jim Killock, Open Rights Group: 07894498127
75- Jo Glanville, English PEN, 0771 302 0971
76- Daniel Carey of Deighton Pierce Glynn solicitors on 0117 317 8133 /
77 07815 089526 / dcarey(at)dpglaw.co.uk
78- Chaos Computer Club: presse(at)ccc.de
79
80 
81
82**Further Information**:\
83\
84Big Brother Watch, Open Rights Group and English PEN, together with
85German internet ‘hacktivist’ and academic Constanze Kurz launched a
86legal challenge to the UK’s internet surveillance activities before the
87European Court of Human Rights on 4 September 2013. They argue that such
88unchecked surveillance is a breach of theirs, and our, Right to Privacy
89under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Any
90interference with that right must be proportionate and in accordance
91with adequate and published legal standards. The law and practice in the
92UK fails to meet either requirement.\
93\
94The Applicants initially sought to bring their case in the UK domestic
95courts and wrote to the UK Government on 3 July 2013 stating that a
96judicial review challenge would be brought. However the government told
97the Applicants that they would have to make a complaint to the
98Investigatory Powers Tribunal (a tribunal that hears complaints against
99the intelligence services in secret). The European Court of Human Rights
100has held in the case of Kennedy v UK that it does not require applicants
101to complain to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal before making an
102application to Strasbourg, due to concerns about its effectiveness and
103its power to grant the remedy that they seek. The Applicants have
104therefore issued proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights,
105which will determine whether UK law breaches international law. It is
106believed to be the first international law challenge based on the
107Snowden disclosures.\
108\
109UK internet surveillance is predominantly regulated by the Regulation of
110Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). This is supposed to ensure that
111internet surveillance is the exception, not the rule. But it has failed.
112Because many of our internet activities can be deemed "external" to the
113UK, the government is able to certify that they are tapped, stored and
114analysed by GCHQ (under section 8(4) RIPA). External communications are
115those where a sender or recipient is outside the UK, as will very often
116be the case. These ‘global’ warrants issued for the TEMPORA programme
117appear to be granted on a continual ‘rolling’ basis. Furthermore, the
118information extracted appears to be freely available to intelligence
119partners such as the NSA. It is equivalent to having all the letters
120passing through the UK intercepted, stored, analyzed, copied and capable
121of being read by a potentially unlimited number of intelligence agencies
122around the world, where this is regarded as being in the 'interests of
123national security'.\
124\
125At the time RIPA was enacted it was not even clear to legislators
126whether or not internet communications would be capable of being
127intercepted in a useful way. Certainly there was no public awareness of
128the enormous implications of the powers granted by RIPA to the
129intelligence services.\
130\
131Similarly, GCHQ’s use of US PRISM data to spy on our internet activities
132has also gone unchecked. Regulators in this country were entirely
133unaware of it until the public disclosures. The most important of those
134regulators, the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee,
135quickly looked into the matter and issued a clean bill of health within
136weeks of the revelations.\
137\
138But further examination shows that investigation to have been extremely
139narrow in its scope and the two page report hardly scratches the
140surface. This entire area is entirely unregulated by any law or
141published regulations.\
142\
143The Applicants are asking the Court to declare that the UK’s internet
144surveillance practices are disproportionate and that the legislation
145intended to protect the public’s rights to privacy in this context is
146not fit for purpose. The practice of issuing surveillance warrants has
147failed and/or been circumvented and those responsible for oversight have
148failed. The Applicants ask the Court to order the UK to adopt internet
149surveillance practices that recognise our rights to privacy. This means
150new laws that require surveillance to be proportionate; to be overseen
151by judicial authorities acting in public; that permit notification of
152persons affected by surveillance (even if after the fact); that are
153overseen by adequately resourced and empowered regulators. In short, a
154legal regime that recognises the Principles on the Application of Human
155Rights to Communications Surveillance (see:
156[https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org](https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text)).\
157\
158
159