From 83334de27398473354100bc021710ca3679bf79a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: 46halbe <46halbe@berlin.ccc.de>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 12:40:32 +0000
Subject: committing page revision 4

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 updates/2017/pc-wahl.en.md | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'updates/2017')

diff --git a/updates/2017/pc-wahl.en.md b/updates/2017/pc-wahl.en.md
index 04e66980..5e7a6151 100644
--- a/updates/2017/pc-wahl.en.md
+++ b/updates/2017/pc-wahl.en.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 title: Software to capture votes in upcoming national election is insecure
 date: 2017-09-07 03:11:00 
-updated: 2017-09-07 09:43:41 
+updated: 2017-09-07 12:40:32 
 author: 46halbe
-tags: update, pressemitteilung
+tags: update, pressemitteilung, voting
 previewimage: /images/LogoPC-wahl.jpg
 
 The Chaos Computer Club is publishing an analysis of software used for tabulating the German parliamentary elections (Bundestagswahl). The analysis shows a host of problems and security holes, to an extent where public trust in the correct tabulation of votes is at stake. Proof-of-concept attack tools against this software are published with source code.
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ independent channel.
 The attack scenarios shown, and the remarkably bad general state of this
 software call into question the security of competing products used for
 the same purpose. In the Netherlands, the Dutch version of another
-product, IVU.elect, used in Germany, was tested by Sijmen Ruwhof. The
-results were not pretty. \[2\]
+product, IVU.elect, used in Germany, was tested by Sjoerd van der Hoorn
+and Sijmen Ruwhof. The results were not pretty. \[2\]
 
 „It is simply not the right millenium to quietly ignore IT-security
 problems in voting“, says Linus Neumann. „Effective protective measures
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