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1title: A Black day for democracy in Hesse - State Supreme Court allows voting computers
2date: 2008-01-23 00:00:00
3updated: 2009-04-18 19:07:50
4author: erdgeist
5tags: update
6
7The State Supreme Court in Hesse has announced NEDAP voting computers can now be used in the Hesse state elections this coming Sunday. The Court justified its decision with jurisdictional reasons since, as a matter of principle, verification is only permissible after the election in an official ballot verification procedure. The Court consequently had no opinion on the constitutionality of the use of NEDAP voting computers. The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) regrets this because the by-elections are now threatened in Hesse in light of the close-run results forecast if a ballot verification procedure is contested after the election.
8
9<!-- TEASER_END -->
10
11With the aid of a Hesse voter the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) filed an
12application for an injunction on January 4th, 2008 in order to prevent
13the use of the contested voting computers in the Hesse state election.
14In this application the CCC first and foremost cited the lack of
15verifiability of the election result and consequently doubts around the
16election's overall legality. German importers HSG Wahlsysteme have for
17years assured local authorities that the pricey NEDAP voting computers
18are secure.
19
20Joint investigations by the CCC with the Dutch foundation "Wij
21vertrouwen Stemcomputers niet" ("We don't trust voting computers")
22demonstrated their susceptibility to manipulation. \[1\] Moreover, the
23election observations subsequently launched at the CCC's initiative have
24publicised major flaws in the use of voting computers by local
25authorities.
26
27The Court did not conduct a detailed appraisal of the technical facts of
28the case in the urgent ruling since these would still be subject to
29query in an official ballot examination. Due to this decision thousands
30of voters in the state of Hesse are being denied the opportunity of
31casting their vote using the traditional tried and trusted paper and
32pencil method.
33
34Election committees, campaign workers and voters will no longer have the
35opportunity to examine the vote - a recount will consist solely of a
36renewed printing out of the result stored in the tabulating computer.
37The compliance to the published model design of the voting computers
38used, or the error-free and tamper-free functioning of the computers'
39software is impossible to reproduce or verify. These still remain the
40manufacturer's commercial secret.
41
42Rejection of the application reveals an enormous gap in electoral law.
43For reasons of procedure voters cannot have the voting procedure
44examined beforehand by the process even though they may have grave
45misgivings. They are merely left with the option of appealing after the
46election.
47
48A number of voters who intend to challenge the ballot after the election
49have already contacted the Chaos Computer Club. CCC and partner
50organisations will be carrying out extensive election monitoring to spot
51irregularities and procedural infringements in the conduct of the
52election. Large-scale infringements of prescribed procedures have
53already been observed in the test votes arranged as a "safety measure"
54by the Hesse Ministry of the Interior.
55
56The core argument of advocates of the NEDAP voting computers is that the
57systems can indeed be manipulated but can be made sufficiently secure by
58additional procedures. This assumption has been clearly refuted, as in
59past election observations.
60
61The ways in which the Hesse State Government and the local authorities
62involved have argued during the legal proceedings reveal an appalling
63attitude to democratic processes. Convenience and the speed of the count
64seem to be the prime objective. Constitutional requirements for the
65election's plausibility and legality plus the secrecy of the ballot have
66now become minor concerns and critical voters are regarded as a source
67of irritation.
68
69An appalling example of disavowal of the democratic process was
70exemplified in the statement from the district of Viernheim. The two
71largest parties in Germany, the SPD and CDU, here have stated that they
72would be unwilling to commit any staff to the counting process if voting
73computers were banned. Some campaign workers even launched a petition
74abandon the count in future. “In view of this attitude the politicians
75in Viernheim should perhaps consider a career in some central Asian
76dictatorship. A smooth running of ballots without recounts is also much
77appreciated there”, commented CCC spokesman Dirk Engling.
78
79A decision is expected in the next few months in other proceedings
80before the Federal Constitutional Court on the admissibility of voting
81computers in connection with the 2005 Bundestag elections. The Chaos
82Computer Club has produced a detailed analysis of the possibilities for
83manipulation and the principal problems of voting computers. \[2\]
84
85The Hesse State Supreme Court's fast-track decision will not impede the
86movement to abolish voting computers in Germany. The increasing doubts
87of many voters of the trustworthiness of NEDAP voting computers should
88even give progressive-thinking politicians pause for thought.
89
90Summarising, CCC spokesman Dirk Engling stated: “In Germany perhaps we
91will soon only be disputing whether a mandate was obtained without
92manipulation. Holders of elected office should understand that a growing
93number of citizens have legitimate doubts about the computerised voting
94process.”
95
96### Links
97
98- \[1\] [Detailed information on the vulnerabilities of NEDAP voting
99 computers](http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/Es3b-en.pdf)
100- \[2\] [Chaos Computer Club's statement of 9th June 2007 for the
101 Federal Constitutional Court
102 (German)](/press/releases/2007/20070609/nedapReport54.pdf)