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author46halbe <46halbe@berlin.ccc.de>2015-07-07 16:08:36 +0000
committer46halbe <46halbe@berlin.ccc.de>2020-05-23 13:39:50 +0000
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1title: State Trojan again on trial in Constitutional Court
2date: 2015-07-06 20:00:00
3updated: 2015-07-07 16:08:36
4author: webmaster
5tags: update, pressemitteilung
6
7Today, the German Federal Constitutional Court tried constitutional complaints against the revision of the Federal Criminal Police Office law (BKAG) from 2008. Central to this trial was the constitutional assessment of governmental trojan spying software. Within this hearing the Chaos Computer Club was asked for an advisory opinion. We publish our arguments delivered in the hearing. [1]
8
9<!-- TEASER_END -->
10
11By means of the revision of the BKAG the Federal Criminal Police Office
12was granted additional powers to infiltrate and manipulate IT systems.
13These covert intrusions in IT systems enable an „online search“ of a
14target's computers and also a „communication source surveillance“. These
15spying tools are supposed to be allowed just by suspicion of a future
16crime.
17
18The trojan surveillance is not bound to a specific device technology.
19The BKAG rather legitimates to aquire data from any kind of device like
20computers, smartphones, tablets, smartwatches or other kinds of
21information and communication technology device.
22
23In 2011, the Chaos Computer Club has analysed a state trojan developed
24by DigiTask, which has been used by several police authorities. \[2\]
25This analysis has clearly shown the enormous risk of exposing infected
26computers to malicious attacks by third parties using the included
27backdoors. Design and implementation flaws make all of the functionality
28available to anyone on the internet. It turned out that the trojan
29allowed remote control by attackers and download of additional software
30besides the officially provided functions available to the authorities.
31Besides, the software could be used to capture audio data from the
32environment independent from any communication.
33
34The fundamental problem of covert infiltration for both kinds of
35malware, an „online search“ trojan as well as a „communication source
36surveillance“ tool, is: In order to successfully implant governmental
37espionage tools security systems have to be exploited permanently.
38
39The Chaos Computer Club speaks out against the plans of infiltration of
40information systems by authorities not only for technical reasons, but
41more importantly so because of the imminent danger of interfering with
42the core area of the private conduct of life, a human's most personal
43information.
44
45**Links**:
46
47\[1\] Advisory Opinion to the Federal Constitutional Court on the
48Federal Criminal Police Office law (BKAG) and state trojan software
49(German)
50<http://www.ccc.de/system/uploads/189/original/BKAG_Stellungnahme.pdf>
51
52\[2\] Chaos Computer Club analyzes government malware,
53[https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner](/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner)