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+title: Software to capture votes in upcoming national election is insecure
+date: 2017-09-07 03:11:00 
+updated: 2017-09-07 08:59:32 
+author: 46halbe
+tags: update, pressemitteilung
+previewimage: /images/LogoPC-wahl.jpg
+
+The Chaos Computer Club is publishing an analysis of software used for tabulating the German parliamentary elections (Bundestagswahl). The analysis shows a host of problems and security holes, to an extent where public trust in the correct tabulation of votes is at stake. Proof-of-concept attack tools against this software are published with source code.
+
+<!-- TEASER_END -->
+
+Hackers of the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) have studied a software package
+used in many German states to capture, aggregate and tabulate the votes
+during elections, to see if this software was secure against external
+attack. The analysis showed a number of security problems and multiple
+practicable attack scenarios. Some of these scenarios allow for the
+changing of vote totals across electoral district and state boundaries.
+„PC-Wahl“, the software in question, has been used to record, analyse
+and present election data in national, state and municipal elections for
+multiple decades.
+
+The result of this analysis is somewhat of a „total loss“ for the
+software product. The CCC is publishing its findings in a report of more
+than twenty pages. \[0\] The technical details and the software used to
+exploit the weaknesses are published in a repository. \[1\]
+
+„Elementary principles of IT-security were not heeded to. The amount of
+vulnerabilities and their severity exceeded our worst expectations“,
+says Linus Neumann, a speaker for the CCC that was involved in the
+study.
+
+A depressing finding of the study is that a state-funded team of hackers
+is not even necessary to control the tabulation of the votes. The broken
+software update mechanism of „PC-Wahl“ allows for one-click compromise.
+Together with the lacking security of the update server, this makes
+complete takeover quite feasible. Given the trivial nature of the
+attacks, it would be prudent to assume that not only the CCC is aware of
+these vulnerabilities.
+
+„A whole chain of serious flaws, from the update server, via the
+software itself through to the election results to be exported allows
+for us to demonstrate three practical attack scenarios in one“, Neumann
+continues.
+
+The software can be used to record the result of the counting in a
+polling station and to transmit the result to the municipality. The
+local election authorities use the same software to aggregate the
+results and transmit them to the state election authorities. In some
+states „PC-Wahl“ is furthermore also used by the state election
+authorities.
+
+The documented attacks have the potential to permanently impact public
+trust in the democratic process – even in cases where an actual
+manipulation would be discovered in hours or days. Whether an actual
+manipulation is discovered at all depends on the procedures followed in
+the various states – at this moment, and as a result of our findings,
+these procedures are being changed. In the state of Hesse it is now
+mandatory to verify every transmission using „PC-Wahl“ using some
+independent channel.
+
+The attack scenarios shown, and the remarkably bad general state of this
+software call into question the security of competing products used for
+the same purpose. In the Netherlands, the Dutch version of another
+product, IVU.elect, used in Germany, was tested by Sijmen Ruwhof. The
+results were not pretty. \[2\]
+
+„It is simply not the right millenium to quietly ignore IT-security
+problems in voting“, says Linus Neumann. „Effective protective measures
+have been available for decades, there is no conceivable reason not to
+use them.“
+
+A government that prides itself on „Industry 4.0“ and „Crypto made in
+Germany“ should promote and use software in the election process that
+has publicly readable source code. \[3\] The election authorities should
+not have become dependent on suppliers using programming and security
+concepts from the past millenium, but instead should promote
+transparency and security of election software by supporting new
+developments and advancing the state of the art. The sad state of this
+piece of election infrastructure is yet more evidence of problems in
+goverment IT. The procedures for tendering software projects need to
+change.
+
+The primary goal of the CCC security analysis was to raise any security
+problems found with the authorities, reminding them of their
+responsibilities. A brute manipulation of election results should be
+harder now because of the raised awareness and changed procedures. For
+the coming national elections of this year, this exposé should not
+prevent anyone from going to the polls to have their vote count (and
+watch the tallying in the evening)!
+
+**Links**:
+
+\[0\] Bericht: Analyse einer Wahlsoftware (German)
+<https://ccc.de/system/uploads/230/original/PC-Wahl_Bericht_CCC.pdf>
+
+\[1\] Software Repository: PC-Wahl
+Tools <https://github.com/devio/Walruss>
+
+\[2\] Sijmen
+Ruwhof: <https://sijmen.ruwhof.net/weblog/1166-how-to-hack-the-upcoming-dutch-elections>
+
+\[3\] „Prototype Fund“ for Open Source
+Software: <https://prototypefund.de/>
+
+\[4\] Logbuch:Netzpolitik
+(German): <https://logbuch-netzpolitik.de/lnp228-interessierte-buerger>