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1title: Bavarian local elections 2008: Computerized count using barcodes is insecure and not transparent
2date: 2008-02-25 00:00:00
3updated: 2009-04-18 19:12:41
4author: presse
5tags: update, pressemitteilung
6
7The Chaos Computer Club highlights severe risks accompanying the use of software-aided barcode counting systems at the Bavarian local elections. During the elections on March 2nd 2008 more than 8000 barcode reading pens and PCs will be used to count the ballots on polling day.
8
9<!-- TEASER_END -->
10
11The barcode-aided count, test-run in bavaria six years ago, is a system
12consisting of a computer, barcode scanner, USB-stick and a software made
13by the "Anstalt für Kommunale Datenverarbeitung in Bayern (AKDB)", which
14translates to "institution for communal data processing in Bavaria". The
15single components are easily manipulated, despite their certification by
16the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior; together they constitute a high
17risk to the integrity of the local elections on March 2nd.
18
19By using this system, it is not possible for the election officers,
20their assistants and the voters to inspect the tallied votes at any time
21during the count; this is only possible in complicated procedures at the
22counting stations. The speaker of the CCC, Frank Rieger, said:
23“Realistically, no assistant has a continuous overview during the count,
24over which candidate or which party received how many votes. A
25manipulation in the background through an invisble malicious programme
26is inconspicious and easily feasible”. The software, as well as the
27final result are saved on a portable USB-stick – hence manipulation is
28easy with a low risk of discovery.
29
30According to an instructor for the system, the assistants can “turn off
31their brains” using the new system, “the software will finish all the
32counting tasks”, an attitude inappropriate for the oversight of the
33democratic process.
34
35CCC research in the communities showed, that general guidelines for the
36handling of the new, computerized count do not exist. Communities make
37up their own rules about the operation of the count with the barcode
38system. For example, one community stores the windows-computers in the
39polling stations unattended over night. Another even asks its election
40assistants to bring their own computer from home, on which the counting
41software then should run.
42
43The barcode pens themselves can be reconfigured in the simplest manner
44through special barcodes – this can not be turned off during the count.
45A single, manipulated ballot in the box can reprogram the barcode used
46for the count.
47
48“Of course it is understandable, that the communities are trying to use
49technological aids to speed up the count of the ballots. But this may
50not be a charter for the uncontrolled use of poorly conceived risky
51technologies”, CCC speaker Frank Rieger said, explaining the CCC's
52opposition to the technologies.
53
54Due to the flawed design of the system it seems impossible to guarantee
55a transparent count of the vote that can be inspected by everybody
56involved in the electoral process.
57
58The communities in Bavaria are clearly nervous about the introduction of
59the new technology, as the software and hardware brings new security
60risks to previously risk-free areas. A technically interested member of
61the CCC was fired as an election assistant, after he had made
62information from his training publicly available on the internet.
63
64Apparently the people who are in charge in Bavaria want to establish
65security through concealment and obscuring the design weaknesses in the
66system and process. But this is deceptive and such a conduct is
67definitely not democratic or transparent. The CCC calls on the
68communities not to use the barcode aided counting procedure due to the,
69now well publicised, risks and count the vote manually.
70
71In contrast to the NEDAP voting computers, there the process still
72remains with a manually countable ballot. The ballot paper is the final
73expression of the voter's will. If the communities use this insecure
74system, the CCC calls on all voters to explicitly demand a manual
75re-count.