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1 | title: NGOs Challenge UK Government Surveillance at the European Court of Human Rights | ||
2 | date: 2017-11-06 00:43:00 | ||
3 | updated: 2017-11-06 07:07:16 | ||
4 | author: remission | ||
5 | tags: update, pressemitteilung | ||
6 | |||
7 | On Tuesday 7 November, three joined cases brought by civil liberties and human rights organisations challenging UK Government surveillance will be heard in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). | ||
8 | |||
9 | <!-- TEASER_END --> | ||
10 | |||
11 | *Big Brother Watch and Others v UK* will be heard alongside *10 Human | ||
12 | Rights Organisations and Others v UK* and the *Bureau of Investigative | ||
13 | Journalism and Alice Ross v UK*, four years after the initial | ||
14 | application to the ECtHR. \[1\] | ||
15 | |||
16 | Big Brother Watch, English PEN, Open Rights Group and Constanze Kurz | ||
17 | made their application to the Court in 2013 following Edward Snowden’s | ||
18 | revelations that UK intelligence agencies were running a mass | ||
19 | surveillance and bulk communications interception programme, TEMPORA, as | ||
20 | well as receiving data from similar US programmes, PRISM and UPSTREAM, | ||
21 | interfering with citizens’ right to privacy. \[2\] | ||
22 | |||
23 | The case questions the legality of the indiscriminate surveillance of UK | ||
24 | citizens and the bulk collection of their personal information and | ||
25 | communications by UK intelligence agencies under the Regulation of | ||
26 | Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). The UK surveillance regime under RIPA | ||
27 | was untargeted, meaning that EU citizens’ personal communications and | ||
28 | information was collected at random without any element of suspicion or | ||
29 | evidence of wrongdoing, and this regime was effective indefinitely. | ||
30 | |||
31 | The surveillance regime is being challenged on the grounds that there | ||
32 | was no sufficient legal basis, no accountability, and no adequate | ||
33 | oversight of these programmes, and as a result infringed citizens’ | ||
34 | Article 8 right to a private life. | ||
35 | |||
36 | In 2014, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism made an application to | ||
37 | the ECtHR, followed by ten Human Rights Organisations and others in 2015 | ||
38 | after they received a judgment from the UK Investigatory Powers | ||
39 | Tribunal. All three cases were joined together, and the | ||
40 | Court exceptionally decided that there would be a hearing. | ||
41 | |||
42 | The result of these three cases has the potential to impact the current | ||
43 | UK surveillance regime under the Investigatory Powers Act. This legal | ||
44 | framework has already been strongly criticized by the Court of Justice | ||
45 | of the European Union in *Watson*. A judgment in this case will finally | ||
46 | push the UK Government to constrain these wide-ranging surveillance | ||
47 | powers, implement greater judicial control and introduce greater | ||
48 | protection such as notifying citizens that they have been put under | ||
49 | surveillance. | ||
50 | |||
51 | Daniel Carey of Deighton Pierce Glynn, solicitor for Big Brother Watch, | ||
52 | Open Rights Group, English PEN and Constanze Kurz, said: “Historically, | ||
53 | it has required a ruling from this Court before improvements in domestic | ||
54 | law in this area are made. Edward Snowden broke that cycle by setting in | ||
55 | motion last year’s Investigatory Power Act, but my clients are asking | ||
56 | the Court to limit bulk interception powers in a much more meaningful | ||
57 | way and to require significant improvements in how such intrusive | ||
58 | powers are controlled and reported.” | ||
59 | |||
60 | Griff Ferris, Researcher at Big Brother Watch, said: “This case raises | ||
61 | long-standing issues relating to the UK Government’s unwarranted | ||
62 | intrusion into people’s private lives, giving the intelligence agencies | ||
63 | free reign to indiscriminately intercept and monitor people’s private | ||
64 | communications without evidence or suspicion. UK citizens who are not | ||
65 | suspected of any wrongdoing should be able to live their lives in both | ||
66 | the physical and the digital world safely and securely without such | ||
67 | Government intrusion. If the Court finds that the UK Government | ||
68 | infringed UK citizens’ right to privacy, this should put further | ||
69 | pressure on the Government to implement measures to ensure that its | ||
70 | current surveillance regime doesn’t make the same mistakes.” | ||
71 | |||
72 | Antonia Byatt, Interim Director of English PEN, said: “More than four | ||
73 | years since Edward Snowden’s revelations and nearly one year since the | ||
74 | Investigatory Powers Act was passed, this is a landmark hearing that | ||
75 | seeks to safeguard our privacy and our right to freedom of expression. | ||
76 | The UK now has the most repressive surveillance legislation of any | ||
77 | western democracy, this is a vital opportunity to challenge the | ||
78 | unprecedented erosion of our private lives and liberty to communicate.” | ||
79 | |||
80 | Jim Killock, Executive Director of Open Rights Group, said: “Mass | ||
81 | surveillance must end. Our democratic values are threatened by the fact | ||
82 | of pervasive, constant state surveillance. This case gives the court the | ||
83 | opportunity to rein it back, and to show the British Government that | ||
84 | there are clear limits. Hoovering everything up and failing to explain | ||
85 | what you are doing is not acceptable.” | ||
86 | |||
87 | **Links:** | ||
88 | |||
89 | \[1\] The ECtHR hearing [on 7 November | ||
90 | 2017](http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings/calendar&c=#n1353927184398_pointer) | ||
91 | |||
92 | \[2\] [privacynotprism.org.uk/](https://www.privacynotprism.org.uk/) | ||
93 | |||
94 | \[3\] [British government to answer fast-track spy | ||
95 | challenge](http://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2014/gchq-egmr) | ||