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title: Bavarian local elections 2008: Computerized count using barcodes is insecure and not transparent
date: 2008-02-25 00:00:00
updated: 2010-09-26 22:41:33
author: presse
tags: update, pressemitteilung, voting
The Chaos Computer Club highlights severe risks accompanying the use of software-aided barcode counting systems at the Bavarian local elections. During the elections on March 2nd 2008 more than 8000 barcode reading pens and PCs will be used to count the ballots on polling day.
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The barcode-aided count, test-run in bavaria six years ago, is a system
consisting of a computer, barcode scanner, USB-stick and a software made
by the "Anstalt für Kommunale Datenverarbeitung in Bayern (AKDB)", which
translates to "institution for communal data processing in Bavaria". The
single components are easily manipulated, despite their certification by
the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior; together they constitute a high
risk to the integrity of the local elections on March 2nd.
By using this system, it is not possible for the election officers,
their assistants and the voters to inspect the tallied votes at any time
during the count; this is only possible in complicated procedures at the
counting stations. The speaker of the CCC, Frank Rieger, said:
“Realistically, no assistant has a continuous overview during the count,
over which candidate or which party received how many votes. A
manipulation in the background through an invisble malicious programme
is inconspicious and easily feasible”. The software, as well as the
final result are saved on a portable USB-stick – hence manipulation is
easy with a low risk of discovery.
According to an instructor for the system, the assistants can “turn off
their brains” using the new system, “the software will finish all the
counting tasks”, an attitude inappropriate for the oversight of the
democratic process.
CCC research in the communities showed, that general guidelines for the
handling of the new, computerized count do not exist. Communities make
up their own rules about the operation of the count with the barcode
system. For example, one community stores the windows-computers in the
polling stations unattended over night. Another even asks its election
assistants to bring their own computer from home, on which the counting
software then should run.
The barcode pens themselves can be reconfigured in the simplest manner
through special barcodes – this can not be turned off during the count.
A single, manipulated ballot in the box can reprogram the barcode used
for the count.
“Of course it is understandable, that the communities are trying to use
technological aids to speed up the count of the ballots. But this may
not be a charter for the uncontrolled use of poorly conceived risky
technologies”, CCC speaker Frank Rieger said, explaining the CCC's
opposition to the technologies.
Due to the flawed design of the system it seems impossible to guarantee
a transparent count of the vote that can be inspected by everybody
involved in the electoral process.
The communities in Bavaria are clearly nervous about the introduction of
the new technology, as the software and hardware brings new security
risks to previously risk-free areas. A technically interested member of
the CCC was fired as an election assistant, after he had made
information from his training publicly available on the internet.
Apparently the people who are in charge in Bavaria want to establish
security through concealment and obscuring the design weaknesses in the
system and process. But this is deceptive and such a conduct is
definitely not democratic or transparent. The CCC calls on the
communities not to use the barcode aided counting procedure due to the,
now well publicised, risks and count the vote manually.
In contrast to the NEDAP voting computers, there the process still
remains with a manually countable ballot. The ballot paper is the final
expression of the voter's will. If the communities use this insecure
system, the CCC calls on all voters to explicitly demand a manual
re-count.
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